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In man~-practical situations, a group of agents have to take strategical decisions in an en~-ironment of risk. The traditional approach of game theory to this problem is to embody such a risk (and the attitude of the players towards it) in the utilitc functions of the players and, then, to solve the problem as a deterministic one. .-~lthough this can be a fruitful approach in a number of occasions, sometimes it will be more appropriate to address the situation in a~ti.a}~which pays more attention to its random structure and to explicitily incorporate such a structure in the proposed solution. onsider, for instance, the following game: two persons, who cannot communicate. ha~-e to sa~-an integer smaller or equal than one million and then. without knowing the other's number. have to choose between et~en or odd. If thev ha~-e not said the same number. they are paid 1,000 dollars each if both have chosen et~en, nothing if both have chosen odd and 500 dollars each otherwise. If they-hace resulted to say-the same number, they are paid nothing if both ha~.e chosen et~en.~1 dollars each (a big amount of money) if both ha~-e chosen odd and :~4~2 dollars each otherwise. If we know nothing about the players (but that they are rational) we could analyze the game, in accordance to the classical approach, in the following way (see, for instance, [2] page 5): we define the pa~-off functions for the players as the expected payoff they obtain; hence, if :~t is large enough, the only equilibrium of the resulting game is (odd.odd). Howe~-er. we think that, in the setting described abo~-e. the onlc rational suggestion for the players is to play ezen because, doing that. they-are playing a`ash equilibrium with a very high probability or. in other words, if any of the play-ers intends to choose odd, he has an incenti~.e to de~~iate with a~-ery high probability (in this example 0.999999).
In this paper we study some solutions for these random games based on a statisticall~--oriented thinking. They consist of combinations of strategies w-hich are the most likely ones to be equilibria looking at the random structure of the situation. 1~'e do not think that this is always the only admissible approach to this kind of conflicts. Howe~.er, we belie~~e that it provides a new and enlightening point of~-iew of the random conflict situations.
It is interesting to remark that a very simple class of random games, approached from this statistical thinking, has been used in [1] to introduce a new solution concept for noncooperative games. This shows again the interest of the statistical point of view when analyzing random games.
Random Games and Maximum Likelihood Equilibria
In this section we present and study a solution concept for random games. l-e begin introducing our model. 
.,~) -~H(r.w) :-(Hi(r.,.,).Hz(r,w).....H"(r.w))
u~here. for erery í E {1....
.n}, r E .1 and ,~; E f2. H;(r.,,~) is the payoff jor the i-th player if r is played and the state of nature is ,.;. [4-e suppose that H is measuraóle as a function of w(for all r~and continuous as a function of r(for all ,,;).
Observe that the model described above is quite general. The condition of separability for the .~; is onl}-a technical one. The properties of ineasurability and continuity of H are not very restrictive but necessary if we want the model to be reasonably-handy.
For every ,.; E 12, we denote by H~, the function which assigns H(r.w) to every r E X. Obviousl~~, G.X, H~; ) is a normal form game for everv ,~; . Bearing this in nund.~~-e give the following definition. .~'(r) :-P{w E f2~.VrÍ~,) -I }.
Clearly, the only tifL`E in the example proposed in the introduction of this paper is. as desired, ( ei~en,eren). However, we can ask ourselves when a certain random game has at least one~1L~E. This is what we deal with next. First we prove the following lemma. .V(ro) ) lim .ti'(rn)
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Proof. For all a E{0.1,2,...} define An :-{,.; E f2~.ti-r"(,.~) -0}, and take wo E.~o. Clearl~., ro is not an equilibrium of the game GWO -G X, Hwo~. Besides, the continuite of Hyo implies that the set of~ash equilibria of Gyo is closed in X and, hence, there exists a neighbourhood E;~o of ro such that.
:~~r ( w0~-~d r E E,~a .
On the other hand, the convergence of {rn} to ro implies that kENttnik;rnEEWo.
ow, the last two conditions lead to 3k E N Hn 1 k; .1'~" (wo) -0.
In summar~-:
This means that 
1-.~-(ro) -P(Ao) G P(liminf.4n) -liminf P(An) -1-lim a(rn).
n-x n-x n-oo From this fact the result can be immediatelv deri~~ed.õ w we are able to pro~-e the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Ei~ery random game G(f2, A. P), X, H 1 satisfying that X is compact has at least one .L1L.~'E.
Proof. Since the image of .ti' is bounded, it has a supremum :11. Hence, we can construct a sequence {rn} in X such that limn~a.~~(rn) -.1~I. The compactness of X ensures the existence of a subsequence {rnk} and a point ro E.~C such that limk-~rnk -ro. Then, applying Lemma 1 we conclude:
.ti-(ro)~lim .~'(rnk) -.~1 1 :~'(r) for every r E X.
-k,x -
In other terms, ro is an 11L`E.~ 5ummarizing. w-e have introduced the~ILtiE and proved its existence for a rather general class of random games. In this process, we have defined a function .`' which measures the possibilities of every combination of strategies r to be a`ash equilibrium. Such a function allows, for instance, to give not only an~1L`E but also its lerel of likelihood.
However there are situations where the function :1' is identically equal to zero. In that case, every r E X is trivially an 11L`E. In the following theorem we present two conditions sufficient to assure that this is not the case. 
Proof. If Condition 1 is fulfilled then
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and hence we can conclude that there exists r E X such that N(r) ) 0. If Condition 2 is fulfilled then, if r is an equilibrium of G.~, H,~) and P({w})~0. we can obviouslv assure that .ti'(r)~0.S o, in Theorem 2 above, we have proved that, in many practical situations. the concept of~1L`E is not a trivial one (in fact, we will often deal with random games of the type "one game is going to be played out of a finite list of games (u.~ith .`'ash equilibria) each of them having a positiLe and knou;n probaóility of being played" which clearly falls in Condition 2. However, it is con~.enient to modify the Definition 3 if, in the corresponding random game, .~-is identicallv eyual to zero. .-t nontrivial case when this can happen is when some of the random variables Hr (we denote by Hr the function which assigns H(r.w~) to every ,.; E f2 ) are absolutely continuous. Obsen~e that, although in these situations .V(r) -0 for all a E X, some x can be such that their corresponding events {~; E i2~.Nr(w) -1} bear more density of probability than others~corresponding events do and, hence, still makes sense to select a maximum likelihood~iash equilibrium. In the next section we present the redefinition of the~1L:~E when .V -0. 
The existence of a measure defined on X is a necessary supposition to define a kind of probability density function containing the information about the`ash equilibria. Apart from that, S1 and S2 are only technical conditions BOR11 et al. g and not~-er}-restricti~-e: for instance, if the sets X, are euclidean spaces and u is the Lebesgue measure. S1 and S2 are fulfilled.
ow we can redefine the~1L~;E for this particular case. [2] Owen G.: Game Theor~-. 2nd Edition. Academic Press.
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